Language, Logic, Logos
STANLEY L. JAKI
PHILOSOPHY OF MACHINES AND
MECHANISTIC PHILOSOPHY
The title of this essay• may seem to contradict the rule that
logic should come first. The rule may be particularly appropriate
in connection with artificial intelligence, a topic synonymous with
computers, or logic machines as they are often called.
Very
recently, the Nobel-laureate biologist Gerald M. Edelman spoke of
computers as logic machines in order to distinguish them from the
human brain: "What a computer can do is an effective procedure.
What you can describe beforehand in a meaningful way, it can deal
with. A computer is a logic machine. The brain is more than a
logic machine ." Immediately following this came the phrase, " It
[the brain] can deal with novelty," which, though the words of the
reporter, obviously reflected the thinking of Edelman. Not content
with emphasizing the d ifference between the brain and the
computer, Edelman made a parting shot at reductionists: "I know
that people have tried to reduce human beings to machines, but
then they are not left with much that we consider truly human, are
they?" In fact he went so far as to claim that " individuality is not
an epiphenomenon; it's at the very center of our humanness." 1
In making these statements Edelman could hardly be unaware of
those who nowadays see in human intelligence a subspecies of
artificial intelligence, or AI for short, an intelligence already
embodied in computers and with unlimited future potentialities.
But he seemed to be unconcerned about the way he used the word
" meaningful" and, more importantly, about the inconsistency of his
own work: a simulation by computer programming, called Darwin
III, of the working of nerve connections in the brain. Those
• Based on an invited lecture at the symposium on "The Human
Dimension in Artificial Intelligence" sponsored jointly by Asbury
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connections, along which information passed between various parts
of the brain, were too numerous in his view to be predetermined
by the genetic code.
Edelman's failure to define the word "meaningful" in a context
relating to computer programming will reveal its problematic and
symptomatic character as the argument of this essay is developed.
More obvious should seem the inconsistency in his method: If the
brain processes in question are too numerous to be physically
specified, then how could they be simulated by a computer
program which contains a set of steps exceedingly limited by
comparison? When inconsistency can work itself into the very start
of the reasoning of a scientist who is most eager to avoid the
pitfalls of equating the mind with a machine, it should not be
surprising that inconsistencies run amok in the writings of those
who glory in the "mind equals machine, machine equals mind"
proposition , which is the very cornerstone of Al as a mental
construct.
A careful look at whether one's first move is logical may not be
really necessary if one dealt with mere machines. Machines, if
properl y constructed, require no more than plainly worded
operating manuals that are useful in the measure in which their
writers make no pretense to philosophical sophistication. Indeed
very little can be written about the philosophy of machines, unless
one is ready to take prolixity for substance. In the philosophy of
machines the essential point can be made, pace Mumford , in a few
lines . Chesterton's dictum, "There must in every machine be a
part that moves and a part that stands still ," is philosophy of its
deepest kind, partly because it is followed by the unwavering
generalization: "There must be in everything that changes a part
that is unchangeable."2
The profundity of Chesterton's dictum becomes obvious as soon
as one considers that in a world of change rational, that is,
meaningful judgments must assume a connection between the
starting and end points of any process. This, however, makes sense
onl y if something remains identical while the process or change
runs its course. The merit of this consideration is recommended
not only by its balanced character, but also by the vertiginous
stances to which any tinkering with that balance inevitably leads.
One such stance is occasionalism or the claim that all events,
Needless to say,
physical or mental, are strictly disconnected.
occasionalism was not referred to when computers were given the
first opportunity, in connection with machine translation, to prove
that they embody some intelligence, even if purely "artificial."
Advocates of Al, who hardly ever demonstrate a serious concern
for basic philosophical problems, let alone their very long history,
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would not, of course, be embarrassed on that score. They are
determined to go about those problems ambulando, that is, in
Diogenes' way of coping with one of Zeno's paradoxes or sophisms.
Nevertheless, the philosophical presupposition that language is
decomposable into strictly separate units has always been a cardinal
tenet in the ideology underlying AI programs including machine
translation. The ideology reveals its Ockhamist character by the
very fact that those units, artificial to be sure, resist efforts aimed
at grouping them into a coherent intelligible whole, such as any
plain discourse.
Those disdainful of wider views would do well to recall four
chief advocates of occasionalism, al-Ashari, Ockham, Malebranche
and Sartre. Being so widely separated from one another in time
and space (and culture), their identical options should seem to
represent a pattern of the inner force of logic. That science and
the making of machines are not germane to occasionalism is amply
illustrated by the virulently antiscientific dicta of al-Ashari and
Sartre. That Ockham and Malebranche were keen on scie nce has
not failed to give headaches to those students of theirs who easily
overlook the ineradicable call of human nature for intellectual
coherence.
The other departure from that balance advocated by Chesterton
is the denial of real change standing for real differences . As will
be see n, spokesmen of Al fall back time and time again on the
claim that intelligent or ultraintelligent machines are poss ible
because the various manifestations of " intellect"-- from amoebas
through rats and dolphins to men- -represent no real differences.
The idea that all events, ideas, things and perceptions lie along an
unlimited continuum and smoothly fuse into one another, has also
been an invariable feature of Al ideology, although it clearly
contradicts the one outlined above. In the thoroughly materialistic
views of Al advocates, novelties are merely the critical points
whe re the gradual accumulation of quantities appears, however
illogically, as a really new grade or quality. Marxists would nod in
agreement. That machines are impossible to make in terms of the
former, or occasionalist, stance, that allows no connectedness,
should seem obvious. It is still to be widely realized that the
making of machines (electronic or not), where parts must be
different in spite of their connectedness, also becomes a logical
contradiction within the continuum principle as embraced in the
ideology of Al.
So much about the philosophy of machines which is very
different from mechanistic philosophy and from the philosophical
or eth ical problems posed by the use of machines and of making
more machines. Mechanistic philosophy came to the fore in the
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second half of the eighteenth century in the wntmgs of De la
Mettrie, d'Holbach, Helvetius and other phi/osophes. In the world
picture they offered man was a mere machine, which, if true,
implied that machines could in principle turn into men, or at least
into the kind of humans that have already been deprived of their
humanness. The machines of the mid-eighteenth century, so many
elaborations on medieval technological breakthroughs, were too
crudely mechanical to appear human, however embryonicall y. Still
too heavily mechanical were the steam engines, the mainstay of the
Great Exhibition of 1851, to appear to be more than powerful tools
of humans rather than their potential competitors. The coming of
electric motors brought some relief from smoke and soot but no
real departure from the markedly non-human unwieldliness of
machines.
The disparity in size between man and machine has not changed
with the transformation of purely mechanical computers, operating
with gears and rods, into the first generation of modern computers
that were huge sets of vacuum tubes. Even the so-called secondgeneration computers, introduced in the 1950s, following the
inventio n of transistors, still occupied much of a large room that,
in addition , had to be air-conditioned.
Only when integrated
circuits allowed the elimination of wires, did computers (their third
generation) begin to shrink. They became similar in size to human
brains only when the introduction of silicon chips gave rise to their
fourth generation . No further major miniaturization seems to come
with their much talked about fifth generation.3 Few users of
typical desk computers, now almost a household commodity in the
USA, have seen, of course, that small brain-size unit that gives
them moments of exhilaration as well as occasional despair. At any
rate, the typical work station can at least by its size give the
impress ion of a possible symbiosis between an artful intellect and
an "artificial" intelligence.
The wide availability, since the early 1970s, of desk co mputers
parallels the flood of writings, most of them boldly assertive, on
the ad vent of Al.
A section on AI, a section distinct from
co mputer manuals, is now a staple feature in major booksto res. So
much about the inexorable logic whereby the celebration of
l'homme machine by Julien Offroy De la Mettrie, 4 leads, o nce
opportunity arises, to widespread belief that some artifacts think as
huma ns do. What is meant here by artificial intelligence is very
different from mere computers and of software called "expert
systems." Had the latte r been called, say, complex data channels, a
possible misunderstanding might have been nipped in the bud .
Awareness about the danger posed for understanding by careless
use of wo rds may in itself commend the merits of starting with
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language, instead of logic, and also may help keep in focus that
those "expert systems" are no more expert in channelling data than

are gutters and canals in hydrodynamics as they drain rain and
marshes.
To forget this is to repeat the pattern whereby "natural
selection" and similar expressions, suggestive of a personal
"Nature" that "selects," have created endless equivocations about
evolution.
Metaphorical attributions of human capabilities to
machines have been greatly responsible for creating the belief
about the existence of electronic feedback mechanisms that are
"experts" and about the reality of a new type of intelligence,
although it is a mere artifact. Expertise, properly so-called , is
synonymous with the ability to think and to plan. That ability is at
the very core of the claim that there are now artifacts that have
intelligence in a manner in which humans do and will soon outdo
all humans in the art of understanding.
In promoting their mechanistic philosophies, the late eighteenthcentury philosophes brazenly exploited the marvels of classical
physics in plain disregard of the anti-mechanistic views of great
eighteenth-century physicists and of Euler in particular. In the
same way the extravagant claims about artificial intelligence
became a vogue only after the creators of analog and digital
computers had done their pioneering work. John von Neumann
who- - no less than H. H. Aiken and Vannevar Bush- - had no use
for "thinking" computers,s had been dead for two years when, in
1958, A. Newell and H. Simon claimed that "there are now in the
world machines that think, learn and create." Most readers of that
phrase were far less startled by that stupendous claim than by its
sequence, namely, that the ability of those machines "to do these
things is going to increase rapidly until--in the visible future--the
range of problems they can handle will be co-extensive with the
range to which the human mind has been applied."6 An age like
ours, which is defiantly contemptuous of basics, can hardly
appreciate the insight demanded by the construction of the first
wheel. Much less would it recognize the enormous superiority of
that insight over the mere cleverness of making better wheels and
many more of them.
It is still to be widely perceived that
understanding does not primarily consist in its vastness but in its
very fact, small as its momentary range may be.
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Failure to appreciate that difference has invited ever bolder

appraisals of AI that now constitute its cultural "phenomenology."
In the process popularizers were greatly encouraged by experts. In
1959, Simon predicted that within ten years "the digital computer
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would be the world's chess champion, unless the rules bar it from
competition."
This contemptuous proviso, so expressive of
confidence in the computer, could appear all the more justified
when presented as a follow-up to a remark of Mikhail Botvinnik,
world chess champion at that time. He not only held that "in the
future the machine should surpass the grandmasters," but also that
parallel to championships among them there would be also one
among chess playing computers. Both Simon and Botvinnik were
quoted in John Pfeiffer's The Thinking Machine,' a book based on
a one-hour program on CBS TV, hardly a stage for serious
thinking. Pfeiffer glibly developed the inability of "experts" to
determine the limits of the computers' "thinking ability" into the
cla im that the further "evolution of computers" will become a
" significant part of human development." 8 Reinforcement did not
fail to come from the experts. Before too long, Newell and Simon
spoke of the programmed computer and the human problem solver
"as two species belonging to the genus 'Information Processing
System'." 9 On behalf of the correctness of that perspective they
offered but the vague generality that both men and computers were
" adaptive."
Once those who in the Al field were known above all for
technical writings had struck a "philosophical" chord, colleagues of
theirs with a visionary zest got emboldened. Caution was nowhere
in sight as a wide sampling of that zest reached the public in late
1970 when Li/e magazine carried an article that, in view of the
shakiness of its reasoning, was aptly titled "Meet Shaky, the First
Electronic Person."10 There Marvin Minsky, a chief protagonist of
Al at MIT, who subsequently turned to computer-generated music,
was quoted as saying that "within three to eight years, we will have
a mac hine with the general intelligence of an average human
being ." (Others who found Minsky's timetable too optimistic, we re
willing to bet on a mere fifteen years!) The really telling aspect in
Minsky's prediction is not that it dismally failed to become true,
but rather the force of logic it reveals. Once a basic though proper
understanding is granted to a computer, no limit can be set to its
self -education. Moreover, that self-education would come with an
explosive speed. Once there is on hand, Minsky contended , a
"machine that will be able to read Shakespeare, grease a car, play
offi ce politics, tell a joke, have a fight," it "will begin to educate
itself with fantastic speed. In a few months, it will be at genius
leve l, and a few months after that, its power will be
incalculable. "11
The only logic in all this was the recognition that the
"incalculable" may contain, like anything truly incalculable , a
terrifying prospect. Once machines achieved, in Minsky's words,
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"immense mentalities," they could hardly be kept under control by
human minds, puny in comparison.
Actually, those machines
would control us and, to continue with Minsky, "we would survive
at their sufferance. If we're lucky, they might decide to keep us as
pets." Logic was quickly honored in the breach when Minsky also
voiced confidence that though "the machine dehumanized man , it
could rehumanize him." Those willing to live with reversals of
logic would then indulge in a masochistic savoring of the
destruction of human intelligence. R. Quillian, described in that
Li/e report as a computer memory expert and a "nice warm guy
with a house full of dogs and children" (in that hardly logical
order), was in fact found to face up intrepidly to the chilling
choice: "I hope that man and these ultimate machines will be able
to collaborate without conflict. But if they can't, we may be
forced to choose sides. And if it comes to a choice, I know what
mine will be. My loyalties go to intelligent life, no matter in what
medium it may arise."U Once more the medium turned out to be
the message.
The inexorable force of logic was at work in the fact that the
"intelligent life" in question did not fail to be described as
universal intelligence, embodied, of course, in the medium of the
Ultra Inte lligent Machine, or UIM for short, a phrase coined in the
early 1970s. One such machine, predicted to be ready by the
1990s, was quickly envisioned as the key to "all major political
decisions, including matters of war and peace."13 Whether the
price of that achievement, "the piecemeal conversion of people into
UIPs" (ultraintelligent people), to say nothing of the "conversion of
the world's population into a single UIP,"14 is worth being taken, is
not the point at issue for the moment. Here the immediate task is
to register a runaway logic: once a computer is granted to
unders tand a single word, the world, or the very cosmos or
universe, becomes the only limit to Al. If holders of distinguished
chairs in Al departments could wax prophetic, their students could
hardly be blamed for seeing visions. Speculation about AI work
elsewhere in the galaxy prompted Hans Moravec, a graduate
student at Stanford University's AI laboratory, to predict that the
Ultra Intelligent Machine would "convert the entire universe into
an extended thinking entity." 15 Roger Schank, computer scientist
at the University of California, was not so modest as to count on
extraterrestrial cooperation: "I think there'll be an all-knowing
machine someday. That's what we're about" (italics added).16
The expression "all - knowing" attached to mere machines may in

itself indicate those deepest roots in AI ideology that are distinctly
theological though hardly in the sense Christians and believers in
an infinitely perfect personal God would take that expression.
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When materialism becomes mystical, the result is a replay of ageold pantheism. Some Greek sages of old, some A verroists (Muslim
and Latin), then Bruno, Spinoza, and Jacobi, and finally Rudolf
Steiner and Arthur Koestler are echoed when an AI devotee, in
innocent ignorance of an age-old pattern, speaks of "the gradual
erosion of individuality, and [the] formation of an incredibly potent
community mind" all across the universe.17 Formerly, the process
was predicated on the "unicity of intellect," or the cosmic mindrepository from which all individual minds emanate at birth and
into which they return after death.
The "unicity of intellect" is a very refined notion in comparison
with the easy metaphors grafted on computers as " all-knowing"
mac hines a nd harbingers of "the elixir of life"l8 or plain
immo rtality. Such implicitly theological metaphors easily take on a
sarcastic hue in the diction of AI protagonists. A case in point is
A. Turing's reference to man's creating the ultra intelligent machine
(UIM), a performance whereby humans act "as instruments of
God's will providing mansions for the souls that He creates."19
Contempt for matters theological shows through E. Fredkin's
pu zzlement over God's failure to make artificial intelligence. The
making of AI would have alone been worthy of that G od whom
Fredk in, tellingly, did not credit with two other events "of equal
importance," or the creation of the universe ("a fairly important
event" in his magnanimous concession) and "the appearance of
life."20
Yet even in this post-theological and post-Christian era, it is
difficult to assume that the idea of a substitute "God" is not at
least subconsciously on the mental horizon when one attributes a
most specific kind of knowledge to "all-knowing" AI machines. It
is not merely knowing all but also knowing all about oneself: "One
artificially intelligent device can tell another not only everything it
knows in the sense that a human teacher can te ll a student some of
what he knows, but it can tell another device everything about its
own des ign , its make-up--its genetic characteristics , as it were-and abo ut the characteristics of every other such creature that ever
was."21 Here, too, logic is inexorably at work as misplaced
presuppositions are allowed to have their full implications
unfo lded.
Again, if AI is taken for the latest and best example of the
human be ing's effort to rise to a "metahuman" level , 22 the soaring
will have its own perils. One of them is the charge, often used
agai nst the "old" religion but now returning as a boomerang against
the "new-fangled" one, that man is merely caught in futile selfprojectio n.
That ultimately all insights of man may be but
thinking abo ut models man makes of himself and of things and not
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about himself and the things around him is the gist of Minsky's
remark: "When intelligent machines are constructed, we should not
be surprised to find them as confused and stubborn as men in their
convictions about mind-matter, consciousness, free will and the
like, for all such questions are pointed at explaining the
complicated interactions between parts of the self-model. A man's
or a machine's strength of conviction about such things tells us
nothing about the man or about the machine except what it tells us
about his model of himself."23
In a less sophisticated way, the same futility is acknowledged
when the reality of AI is predicated on its eventually becoming as
bored with itself as humans become with themselves.24 Finally,
there is the fearful possibility, hardly exorcizable on the basis of
AI ideology, that man, in inventing things, is but the dupe of a
blind runaway process. The testimony of Turing should seem to be
impeccable as the "Turing's test" still lingers on as the ultimate
touchstone of truth for Al. As he discussed with his friend, the
mathematician A. H. Newman, the construction of a large digital
computer known as MADAM (the Manchester Automatic Digital
Machine at Manchester University), also present was Mrs. Newman
who, though much of the conversation was above her head,
suddenly picked up a remark of Turing: "I suppose when it gets to
that stage we shan't know how it does it." In reporting this to
Turing's mother, Mrs. Newman added that the remark "sent a
shiver down my back."25 Nothing is so fearful as an all-knowing
being that becomes a complete mystery.
The claims about Al reaching pseudo-theological heights have
been recalled here at the outset as an illustration of the merciless
manner whereby logic exacts its due. The claim that a machine,
once sufficiently sophisticated, does think, has innumerable
consequences. Since these include not only their philosophical,
psychological, and sociological but also their theological varieties, a
theological reflection, of a very different kind of course, on Al
should seem entirely legitimate even on the basis of mere parity.
But there is, as will be seen, a justification for that reflection far
more serious than the one assured by the rules of civilized
debating .
In the second half of the 1960s, when my Brain. Mind and
Computers was researched and written, not much was yet visible of
the rising tide of interest in Al and much less that it would turn
into an infatuation that blocks sensitivity for plain logic. An
illustration of this is Pamela McCorduck's admission that "if the

effort to make artificial intelligence has taught us one thing, it is
that natural intelligence is a formidable and woefully underutilized
resource."26 Had she utilized that resource more effectively, her
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book may not have ended on a love affair with anti-intellectualism .
For if her foregoing statement has any coherence, she cannot be
consistent in stating that "the accomplishments [of AI research)
have been significant and the promises are nearly beyond
comprehension. "27
Contrary to McCorduck, inconclusive arguments and selfcontradictory reasonings cannot be settled by references to the
difference between Hellenic and Hebraic minds, the former not
subject to brooding and the latter given to it. (It is indeed strange
that so many Hebraic, though wholly secularized, minds in the Al
establishment are most vociferous with their disclaimers of having
second thoughts on the matter. Or do they protest too much?)
Nor will those arguments and reasonings become non- existent by,
to quote McCorduck, " claiming fortitude, exhibiting courage," and
by "pausing to savor the thrill of sharing in something awesome."28
Such declamations set the tone (distinctly unintellectual) of nine
out of ten books on AI nowadays displayed in any large bookstore.
The prospects they conjure up are awesome, not because of the
chances, absolutely nil, of the coming of intelligent machines.
(A bout that dream world in which those machines exist, one thing
should , however, be noted. There they cannot help being locked in
an "awesome," blind, life-to- death struggle with themselves and
with us according to that Darwinist ideology which, because it rests
o n the continuity of all, heavily supports dreams about AI). The
actual awesomeness of those prospects pertains to the intellectual
and not to the biological level. Were the human body threatened
by fa ntasies about Al, the Food and Drug Administration could
eas ily move in, as it did recently on finding that leading producers
of cosmetics have taken to marketing their magic facial creams and
other "elixiric" ointments under scientific labels as if they were
well-tested drugs. Such creams have for time immemorial been
harmless though very costly make-beliefs about make-up. Those
who can afford spending large sums on unguents that act as elixirs
of lege ndary fountains of youth, are free to deceive themselves.
Equa ll y, the producers of those " miraculous" chemicals are free to
be part of a lucrative game of mutual self-deception. But when
scientific labels came to be used to abolish the difference between
rea lity and fantasy, the F.D.A . decided that society deserved to be
protected.29
THE REALITY OF FIRST BASE
No such action is, of course, conceivable in matters purely
intellectual. The harm to the intellect may be the greatest of all
harms, but it is neither legal, nor culturally respectable, to call for
censo rship. The marketing of AI under scientific label will only
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increase in decibels if this is possible at all. Momentary admissions
about "chronicling the history [of Al] as one of the most wrongheaded human follies in existence"30 are artful means of disarming
the typical reader's suspicion that both sides of the coin have been
equally presented. Little does that reader realize that as far as
reasoning is concerned the cards have been heavily stacked against
reason . Even less would that reader guess the farce which is latent
in the game played with the mechanism that carries the ploy. The
mechanism is language which, if carefully considered, may through
its very terms, reveal the fallacy of a logic according to which
some, let alone all, machines have intelligence.
That language is a subject that eludes a simplistic approach
should have been amply clear to those who in the 1950s tried to
make the breakthrough to Al along the lines of machine translation .
The evidence, which only gained in strength since then, was plain
about the chronic failure of linguists to find a primitive language.
In fact, languages of all primitive peoples have been found to
display syntaxes as complex as is the case with any modern
language. For the most part rank amateurs alone keep constructing
futile schemes in which basic words of all languages are made to
appear as close parallels to sensory experiences stretching from
hardness to softness, from suddenness to slowness and so forth.31
Only with a touch of amateurism can one disregard a by-now-old
story which shows that the decomposition of languages into
atomistic units is indeed a futile exercise.32 Only wishful thinking
can make one overlook the fact that Darwinist evolutionary theory
is caught in a petitio principii whenever it tries to cope with the
problem of the origin of language.
The pattern made its first and dramatic appearance shortly
before Darwin completed The Descent of Man. There he merely
paraphrased the imperious No! (hardly a scientific argument) which
he had penned on the margin of a paper that Wallace published
shortly beforehand. Wallace correctly argued that if language had
its origin in the need for survival, the larger brain that makes
possible linguistic operations had to be available to pre-hominids
before they sensed the need for language.33 Nothing essentially
new was added to this observation (a warning about the futility of
trying to lift oneself by one's bootstraps) when N. Chomsky dressed
it up with the claim that special neuronal networks have to be
present in the brain before it can serve as a vehicle of that only
form of language which operates with sentences. 34
All these considerations, so many exposures of the shortcomings

of the scientific method, fail to touch on the true nature of
language. Being a reality, steeped in the use of the intellect,
language requires for its proper appraisal an epistemology if it is
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really about episteme or understanding and not about mere
formalisms of it. But even on a purely empirical ground, it should
be clear that language is a communication of something understood
to somebody capable of understanding. Although propagandists of
Al have always been wary about confronting this elementary
feature of language, they recognize it by their use of language as
they talk in private or in public about their favorite subject. They
may speak of language as if it were a mere skeleton, but in doing
so they still "press the flesh," that is, they want to be understood
by flesh-and-blood intelligent beings.
In that fact of understanding, as verbally communicated, there is involved a procedure
which goes far beyond mere formalization . The latter can become
its own object and retain no meaningful tie with the object of
which it was the formalization in the first place . Understanding
always bears directly on its object, the very reason why any talk
becomes a mere shooting of the breeze unless it is about something.
Verbalization is a connection between the subject who
understands and the object which is understood. That connection
between the object and the subject is a tie between two existents,
with the tie being not only conceptual but also existential, though
not in the sense given to that word by Sartre and his followers .
They voiced contempt for arguments that implied validity beyond
the moment, while they failed to notice that they meant their brand
of existentialism to have a validity for each and every mome nt.
More importantly, as they wanted to be understood through their
discourses, they served evidence that language as an intellectual
communication is a primary datum, not explainable in terms of
something else, and certainly not in terms of a language which is
not intellectual.
Language is not the only datum which is primary or primiti ve.
Other such data or factors are no less important to list, especially
in a debate with Al propagandists whose basic strategy is to set up
a very special game aimed at skirting around the very first step.
Thus, to use baseball as an analogy, they try to make it appear that
starting from the second base is not a break of the rules. Implicit
in that strategy is the assumption that any earlier step, such as
facing the pitcher and producing a hit that allows the runner to
reach first base, let alone second base, is not a matter of truly valid
rules. Translated into epistemology, the analogy means that basic
or primary questions need not be asked, and in particular the
question of what it means to know anything before one can reflect
about formalizable aspects of that knowledge. In trying to make
their intellectual game appear creditable, the propagandists of AI
act very much for a purpose, though in terms of their " rules of
game" they are not entitled to do so. Such is a further serious
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chink in their armor to be discussed shortly.
Since few champions of Al have given evidence of familiarity
with basic epistemological questions, it may not be useless to spell
out the thrust of that game analogy.
Since the advent of
rationalism, Cartesian and Kantian, to say nothing of the
skepticism and pragmatism it generated, it has become a sign of
cultural sophistication that basic epistemological questions about
understanding the real have no validity. The alleged reason for
this is that to raise those questions is not a "scientific" procedure.
Invariably overlooked in that reasoning is that science deals only
with the forms of already existing things and much less does it
provide those forms, let alone the things. So much about the
genesis and merits of the claim that intellectual pursuit must start
from second base where the formalizable or quantitative aspects,
solely useful for scientific purposes, are already available.
That the real as the carrier of those aspects cannot be accounted
for by the rules of that new-fangled epistemological baseball game
has a telling impact on the thinking of those fond of its "rules."
The impact is all too often observable in the writings of logical
positivists, almost invariably the only kind of philosophers read by
devotees of AI. Some logical positivists have indeed been logical to
the point of realizing that their disdain of reality traps them in
their own world-building, a sort of solipsism .35 One "hacker"
made the point bluntly: " You can create your own universe, and
you can do whatever you want within that. You don't have to deal
with people."36 Except, of course, when the "hacker" wants to
market his software about his private universe so that he may have
access to the non-private mini-universe of a supermarket for the
daily bread.
Mere logicism or solipsism cannot be refuted on its own
grounds. The only effective argument against solipsists must rely
on the reality of language as an intellectual tie with the real outside
the subject. On that basis alone can one point out to the solipsist
that he has no right to leave his own universe by talking to others
about it. The only right solipsists (including their Al brand) have
is to cherish their own dreams.37
Only when that point is made clear can one call attention,
without the danger of being trapped in mere voluntarism or
subjectivism, to another primary factor, the sense of purpose.
Acting for purpose is different from mere instinct evident, say, in
the unreflective pulling back of one's hand after it has come into
Unlike an instinctive act, an
contact with a hot object.
intellectually perceived action is to be acted on by a conscious will
if the sense of purpose is to arise. This alone should make it clear
why the argument that although Al may cope with knowledge it
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cannot cope with purpose, is no real threat to speculations about
it. 38 The argument cannot forestall the counterargument that if Al
can imply an understanding of the real , then its understanding of
the purposeful action may become tantamount to being possessed of
real purpose as well. Similarly, machines cannot effectively be
denied self-awareness, unless emphasis is laid on the fact that selfawareness is not a mere idea, but a real perception of the subject
insofar as it is its own real object, and that this perception
presupposes awareness of objects separate from the self.39
Purposeful action involves not only an intellect whose nature is
to know things, but also a will that is a mere instinct if it is not
free. The freedom of the will, another primary datum that cannot
be circumvented or leapfrogged, has always been a source of
nightmares for those dreaming about a purely "scientific" or
strictly deterministic state of affairs fully engulfing man. Those
dreams, as long as they are mere games with the intellect, have
always been less repulsive to common sense than plain denials of
free will. This is why AI ideology contains more fantasies about
the fusion of all intellects into one than about the sublimation of
all free wills into one Will that no argument can make appear
free,40 so that the wills participating in It may have this share of
freedom.
Undue preoccupation with scientific evidences had for some
time been undermining sensitivity about much more immediate
evidences before Al came to the scene. This is not to suggest that
this process, mostly psychological, has resulted in lessening the
weight of evidences much more immediately available than their
scientific kind. One of them is one's immediate awareness about
one's ability to move one's little finger at will. About the weight
of this evidence no less a physicist than A. H. Compton noted that
it inte nsely outweighs all evidences of Newtonian physics. In fact,
he held the disparity so great that he preferred the abandonment of
that physics, were it to contradict the foregoing evidence about
free will.41
Newtonian physics, which is very different from mechanistic
philosophy, or from materialist determinism, can be no more in
opposition to the freedom of the will than quantum mechanics can
be a support for it. In both cases the limitations of the scientific
method foreclose that this or that law, formalism, or experimental
result of physics should have legitimate bearing on the reality of
free will. Tellingly, no physicist who subscribed to materialist
determinism has ever claimed that his work in physics was not a
free activity. There was at least one early interpreter of quantum
mechanics, Eddington, who publicly recognized the nonsensical
character of his claim that quantum mechanics made first possible a
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rational belief in the freedom of the wilJ.42
Unfortunately,
countless is the number of physicists who, from Heisenberg on,
declared the abolition of causality in the name of quantum
mechanics. They all failed to perceive the fallacy in the inference
that an interaction that cannot be measured exactly, cannot take
place exactly. The inference is fallacious because "exactly" taken
in an operational sense is very different from "exactly" taken in an
ontological sense.43
Possibly, the literature promoting Al is lacking in references to
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle because of a lopsided
preoccupation there with mere patterns in logic. 44 Unfortunately,
one cannot assume that advocates of AI--so much the prisoners of
various current intellectual fashions--would remain free of that
pervasive fashion which confuses quantum mechanics, a marvelous
physics, with its Copenhagen interpretation , a most fallacious
philosophizing.45 An interpretation, which is most germane to
sheer phenomenology or to mere pragmatism, will not fail to appeal
to protagonists of AI as in both only knowledge about aspects or
forms of th ings is allowed but no knowledge about the very things
existing.
The better-known result of this is a decrease of
confidence in the objectivity of knowledge, accompanied by the
stultifying claim that the observers create reality. They certainly
create--the multiworld theory of quantum mechanics is witness46-their own subjective worlds or universes. The lesser-known but no
less instructive result is the inevitable reification of mere aspects
and relations as if they had an existence of their own. It is on that
basis that, as so often happens in endorsements of AI, the sign is
taken as equivalent to the thing signified.
That non-realist, non-objectivist philosophies are driven , as if
by an inexorable logic, to reinstate, however illogically within their
perspective, the objectivity of knowledge, is an illustration of the
fac t that picket lines, useful as they may be elsewhere, are
powerless against the reemergence of age-old truths. Among these
is the view of knowledge as a mental act to know things. Merely
to know, without knowing something, is impossible. Moreover,
that some thing has to be a real object before it can become a
conceptual object in the act of knowing.
THE DYNAMISM OF KNOWLEDGE
He rein lies a crucially important aspect of knowledge with
respect to Al. The act whereby one becomes a knower is the
forging of a dynamic tie between the mind and an object. Such a

tie is not a conceptual or static relation between the concept of the
mind and the concept of something else. Were the latter the case,
thinking would be resolvable into conceptual analysis. This is not
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to suggest that thereby a royal road would be open to Al. As will
be seen, most concepts have supple contours that cannot be
accommodated within the cubbyholes of binary algebra or of any
mathematics for that matter. Still, it cannot be emphasized enough
that knowledge is above all an act that establishes a dynamic unity
between the object and the intellect. The unity is not a reduction
of the object to the subject, nor of the subject to the object. The
former case should easily be recognizable as Kantianism, the latter
as a variant of Platonism . Both, in their own ways, block access to
external reality and by the same stroke spark doubts about the
mind as it is being turned, against its nature, into a source of
reality (in Plato) or of its structure (Kant).
Nothing may be more logical at this point than to recall Aristotle
as the erstwhile protagonist of the epistemological stance which
consists in the resolve to render both mind and matter their due.
Such a recall is especially appropriate at a time when a return to
Aristotle is advocated as a remedy to the "closing of the American
mind." 47 Its author failed to list AI ideology among the sickly
symptoms to be cured by an exposure to Aristotle. That the
remedy will not be easily found may be gathered from the rank
misconstruction of Aristotle's philosophy in the most widely read
critique of Al ideology by one holding a Ph.D. in philosophy from
a prestigious American university. More of this later.
Even more revealing than a recognition of that remedy was the
cryptic admission that Aristotelianism, owing to its being taught in
Catholic colleges, did not become entirely unknown in America.
That in a book written by an academic mostly for fellow academics
the survival of Aristotelianism was not specified any further has
more to it than what meets the eye. In those Catholic colleges
Aristotle was kept alive because of belief in Someone who made a
far greater impact in history than did Aristotle. For reasons that
should not be difficult to fathom, Christ is not to be acknowledged
as a gigantic fact of history in a culture that boasts about its
respect for facts alone. At any rate, the Aristotelianism taught in
Catholic colleges, seminaries and universities is an Aristotelianism
that was saved by faith in Christ from Aristotle himself.48 How
Aristotle's thinking can turn into a self-defeating straitjacket
received ample illustration in Averroes and the A verroism he
started. Averroes found nothing repulsive in Aristotle's lack of
resolve to save the individual intellect from being submerged into
one "cosmic" mind.
Nor was Averroes agitated by Aristotle's
hes itation to recognize the freedom of the will. If the reaction to
Aristotle on the part of medievals, and especially of Thomas, was
so different on those two points (and on some other crucial points
as well), 49 it was due to their unswerving allegiance to the gigantic
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fact of Christ, which reveals the true God in true man.
This is not the place to recount a story, vastly documented in
researches on medieval philosophy during the last hundred years.
The story tells about the immense debt which Christian philosophy,
or moderate realism, owes to its allegiance to dogmatically defined
tenets about Christ as a union of two natures (divine and human)
in one divine person. Those tenets, which include the survival of
C hrist's true human soul (or mind) after his bodily death on the
cross, were so many unfoldings of what is contained in the
principal ecclesial dogma, issued at Nicea in A.D. 325, about Christ
as th e Incarnate Divine Word, or Logos, consubstantial with the
Father.5° Nothing would be more mistaken than to take for a
purely philosophical proposition the unflinching resolve with which
the dualist doctrine about man is maintained in genuine Christian
ambience, and not also for a most considered reflection on the
gigantic fact which is Christ.
Non-Christians (and even liberal, well- nigh secularized
C hris tians) will hardly appreciate this Christological perspective of
a doctrine about the nature of man. Excuse themselves as they
may on "religious" grounds, they have no such liberty when it
comes to that doctrine's epistemological fruitfulness . The latter
extends even to taking a proper measure of the true merits of AI.
The doctrine implies a dualism, though certainly not its Cartesian
kind , where the soul or mind is never truly united with the body
but me re ly attached to it. According to that dualism, the mind is
not a ghost in a body-machine,51 elevated as the latter is to the
status of a "computer that happens to be made out of meat," to
recall a crude phrase of a champion of AJ.52 The mind is rather in
the most intimate symbiosis with the body and carries out its
activity in the utmost dependence on the body.
This means, on the one hand, that the acts of knowledge are
trul y inte llectual, that is, they transcend the limitations of material
entities. This is why any knowledge of any material entity has a
uni versal bearing, or in technical terms, the intellect perceives the
uni versal in the particular and that this is its only way of knowing
particular things. Herein lies the fundamental and only ground for
den ying the claim that machines, composed of truly singular items
and singular in all their workings, can know as much as a single
word or symbol. Herein lies also the justification of the view that
unless such knowledge is denied to a computer, there is no way of
d enying to it the ability to know all words, symbols and their
syntactical combinations. Failure to make recourse to this kind of
knowledge leaves the critics of AI with lame alternatives. They
will either limit Al to knowledge as distinct from purpose, will and
emotions,53 or they will say that there can be an Al about ordinary
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knowledge but not about creative knowledge and wisdom.54
The view of knowledge as the active recognition of the universal
in the singular has its proof in each and every word--noun, verb,
adjective. None of them can be restricted to a single thing, action
or quality. All of them are universals that can be seen only by the
mind's eye in any singular sensory perception. Any word is a
magic tool whereby a concrete limited item appears in a limitless
perspective. In that sense no book is so systematically packed with
metaphysics as is any ordinary dictionary. There word after word
bespeaks of that wondrous ability which is to generalize. To
restrict any word to a singular empirical item can only be done
with the help of two most generic words, this and that. Every use
of them (on countless occasions in each and every day) witnesses
the working of the mind's dynamism that alone, by its existential
presence, can turn the singular item to useful account even from
the strict pragmatist viewpoint. The mind's presence should seem
even more in evidence when it effectively describes most particular
situations and relations by a word it, possibly the most nondescript
word of them all and yet a word which the mind can invest with
overpowering weight.SS
A WORD ABOUT WORDS OR SYMBOLS
About that dynamic or existential manner which is present in
the use of words as means of reaching the real world, two remarks
are in order. One is that it reflects the same dynamic quality that
has already been noted about the act of knowledge itself. Words
are not the mechanical images of things physical, or of physical
actions and qualities. Precisely because of this they can only serve
as means of reaching the real insofar as it can be understood .
Whatever else words are, they cease to be words unless they are in
the active service of the intellect. In fact, all of them are the
intellect's free creations as shown by the incredible variety of
languages. (No Jess evident is this fact in a facet present in each
and every language: one word--the example of the English "bit"
will be discussed shortly--can denote a bewilderingly wide variety
of objects and actions). This is why words exist only inasmuch as
the intellect uses them as signs that mean something only because
the intellect actually signals with them things, actions and qualities.
Nothing is indeed more dangerously misleading than Popper's
turning of the world of phonetic and written symbols (and all the
cultural plethora resting on them) into a "third world"; that is, into
a realm on equal footing with the mind and the purely physical
realm. As will be seen shortly, it is precisely because of this that
Popper's stance versus Al is a mere evasion.
Symbols or signs are, however, very tangible items. In an almost
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literal sense they embody what is intelligible in the concrete
particular. Therefore they take part in that fundamental characteristic of each concrete thing which is to have form. Herein lies
the source of an unlimited opportunity for computers and also of
their radical limitedness.
No limit seems to be set to the computer's receptivity in those
areas where the formal aspect is almost identical with its content.
Such areas are mathematics and geometry, with their manifold
ramifications and vast range of applicability. Units, fractions,
points, lines, angles, areas, volumes, coordinates, transforms,
logarithms, functions and series have a meaning that is almost
exhausted in their "forms." Hence the stunning measure to which
computers can be programmed to correlate very complex set of
numerical data, a measure which is made even more impressive by
the speed with which the task is executed.
In any problem in which words relating to quantitative data
dominate , as they do in many problems of business and
engineering, the effectiveness of computers can indeed be made so
great as to create the impression that they do an "expert" job. But
in the measure in which one departs from the strictly quantitative
or geometrical realm, words, always the carriers of meaning, offer
fewer and fewer formal aspects of things and ideas they represent.
This is already evident in words denoting plain physical entities,
such as a stone or a stick. Even their weight, density and hardness
are far more than so many numerical measures. This disparity
between physical reality and its formalizable aspects becomes still
more striking when complexity and vastness are part of that reality,
let alone when it is the source of an aesthetic experience, as is the
case, for instance, with a human figure or a sky bathed in the rays
of the setting sun. An even more perplexing disparity between
form and content is latent in negative terms, such as invisible or
intangible. A debilitating problem for AI may be posed, for
instance, by the term "atom," if it really stands for something that
cannot be cut or divided. Any formal representation of an "atom"
by an extended symbol or signal, which is always divisible, implies
Similarly
a contradiction with the idea to be represented.
instructive is the impossibility of adequately formalizing the
process involved in "going to the limit" in integral calculus. In
that respect the square root of - I should seem to take on an added
measure of irrationality.56
When one moves to the area of words dominating everyday
discourse that are not primarily quantitative, the formalistic aspects
no longer have the definite contours that most mathematical
concepts have. While much of mathematics may be built up from
the juxtaposition of units, and much of geometry from similar
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operation with an extended point (leaving aside the problem of
formalizing a non-extended point), other areas of discourse rely on
words with no strict contours. This is why defining most words in
any dictionary is always an unfinished job. Even in the case of
objects with markedly geometrical forms, the "extent" of their
meaning can indeed be rather indefinite.
Thus the word "bench" is defined in The Random House
Dictionary as "a long seat for several persons." The definition does
not give the exact measure where a seat becomes a bench. Nor
does the definition specify the word "several." Whereas "two" can
mean "several," a "love-seat" does not thereby become a bench.
When a word, which is often the case, carries several
me taphorically different meanings, their respective formalizations
may have no similarities at all. Here it should be enough to think
of the widely different formalizations called for when, say,
"bench" stands for judicial authority, or for the judges themselves,
or for substitute players, or for a good or bad team, or for a shelflike area of rock with steep slopes above and below. Further
differences in formalization will arise when "bench" is used as a
verb.
Even more bewildering differences come into view whe n, as is
the case with "bit," homonymous uses are possible. From the
viewpoint of meaning there is absolutely nothing in common
between the mouthpiece of a bridle, a small measure of time,
twelve and a half cents, the cutting part of a hatchet, the end of a
key that moves the bolt, a part in a play, units of information as
defined in computer theory, and a B(achelor) of I(ndustrial)
T(echnology).57 The fact that this short paragraph contains at least
one other word, "bolt," that also lends itself to homonymous use,
ma y suggest the enormous number of such words that could be
gathered from the same dictionary. Proportional to that number
should be the "fun" such words present to ambitious programmers
of conversations "understood" by computers.
That in all such cases the "exact" meaning, which is always far
more than its formalization, can only be established from the
context, should be obvious. Such a context is the definition of
eac h and every word in any dictionary. Almost all of them are
based on a recourse to synonyms, each with an " extent" of
mean ing that can be circumscribed only by dotted lines. Being
used in a definition, these not strictly defined areas of meaning are
made to partially overlap one another. The more " exact" is a
definition of a word, the greater is its share in those not strictly
c ircu msc ribable overlappings. The more of them there are on
hand, the greater is the " formal" imprecision , both with respect to
content and to total outline, that is, the "extent" of meaning. Such
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is a graphic rendering of the reason that prompted Whitehead to
speak of the "Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary."SS
Why is it then that verbal definitions, or any discourse for that
matter, are not a potential vicious circle? For such would be the
case if knowledge were, as Hobbes claimed, a mere reckoning with
words,.s9 a perspective very much at the basis of the AI ideology.
Then the explanation of a word, always imprecise in itself, in
terms of other imprecise words, would become equivalent to the
compounding of probabilities, or to the decrease of certainty or
clarity. The reason why the best minds usually take the fewest
words is not that they are in sympathy with the consequences of
Hobbes' hopelessly flawed view. Rather, they cast a vote on behalf
of the dynamism whereby language is an exercise of an intellect
zeroing in on the intelligible object with unfailing immediacy.
THE UNWISDOM AND POVERTY OF REDUCTIONISM
The intelligible character of the spoken or written word that
carries a meaning has an epistemological primacy even in that
realm , mathematics and geometry, where the formalized aspect may
seem self-explaining. Actually, it was in connection with the most
formalized systematization of mathematics, the one worked out by
David Hilbert, that his foremost disciple, Hermann Weyl, wisely
stated that even there "one must understand directives given in
words on how to handle the symbols and formulae."60 That this is
also true of the notations of symbolic logic should seem all the
more logical, except perhaps to some infatuated with it. Those
who are strangers to what Hilbert, Wey! and other leading
mathematicians deal with still can grasp the priority of words over
formulae and shapes by reflecting on the figure indicating the
"quantity" called zero. Unless an intellect substantially superior
over matter were at work in the pronunciation of the word "zero,"
the word itself would necessarily stand for " something," the very
opposite of nothing. The formalization in the shape of a small oval
circle of the concept of zero may indeed be the most explosive
among all discoveries of the mind, "the coining of Nirvana into
dynamos." 61
At the other end of the quantitative spectrum is that infinite
whose description as the realm where " zero is the magician king,"62
will appeal only to the wise. It should be enough to think of the
resistance which some advocates of the " transfinite" infinite set up
against the logical stringency of the inference whereby one
concludes to the impossibility of an actually realized infinite

quantity.63 About the schizophrenic reasoning which supported for
so long in scientific cosmology the presumed reality of an infinite
universe,64 a remark of Eddington may seem most appropriate:
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"That queer quantity 'infinity' is the very mischief and no rational
physicist should have anything to do with it."65 Wise programmers
take note!
Just as in moving from basic words used in mathematics to
words relating to everyday realities one encounters an increasing
disparity between meaning and its formalization, a similar situation
is on hand when one moves from mathematics to the empirical
sciences. This fact received a poignant recognition in a remark of
Professor George Wald, a Nobel laureate for his studies of the
phys iology of vision . Much as we know about the physics and
che mistry of vision, he remarked, " we don't know what it means to
see." 66 The source of epistemological defeatism (and touch of
unwisdom) transpiring through his remark lies in the assumption
that understanding consists in knowing all the quantitative , that is,
easi ly formalizable, aspects of a process and that whenever we
don't have complete information about those aspects, we don' t
understa nd.
A chief merit of Professor Wald's remark is that its ill -concealed
defeatism evokes the poverty of reductionism , a poverty brought
about by sheer unwisdom.
Reductionism is the very same
philosophy that lies at the base of hopeful statements about AI.
They all share in the facile oversight of two facts: One is that as
close as form and meaning may be in basic mathematical notions,
the form as such means nothing unless it is understood. The other
is that understanding is a primary datum that cannot be reduced to
something else so that it may be better understood or understood at
all. Reductionism, which, once grafted on the interpretation of
sc ience, turns the latter into a cultural wasteland, is also the source
of the pathetic predicament generated by belief in AI. There one
can also see the hapless resistance of human sanity to becoming the
victim of self-despoilment.
A telling illustration of this is Douglas R. Hofstadter's Godel,
Escher, Bach, a book offered by him as a perspective on the battle
that still rages between the followers of De la Mettrie and their
opponen ts. Hofstadter assigns ultimate victory, which he specifies
as o ne of the major theses of his book, to De la Mettrie's followers
on the ground that the opposition between the two camps does not
represent a "contradiction at all." The ground is equivalent to
stating that one's opponents are actually non-existent, a way of
reso lving crucial differences worthy of that make-believe realm
which is nowadays being crowned by copious assertions about the
existe nce of Al. Yet the battle line separating those opponents
re mai ns as real as ever. A proof of this is Hofstadter's oversight of
the fact that from his point of view it is plainly contradictory to
urge "each reader" to engage in a most non-mechanical activity,
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namely, "to confront the apparent contradiction head-on, to savor
it, to turn it over, to take it apart, to wallow in it, so that in the
end the reader might emerge with new insights into the seemingly
unbridgeable gulf between the formal and the informal, the
animate and the inanimate, the flexible and the inflexible."67
That Hofstadter, a physicist turned philosopher, failed to urge
his readers to reflect on what it means to understand both that
battle and the activity he recommended, should not seem
surpr1S1ng. The act of understanding that cannot be understood in
terms of anything else is not part of the instruction offered in the
philosophy departments of most American universities . There one
is allowed to discuss intelligent behavior, which Hofstadter
explicitly mentions in the context, but not what it means to be
intelligent.
There philosophy begins with Descartes (or with
Ockham), grows into pragmatism, logical positivism, and linguistic
analysis, and ends with the illusion that no respectable philosopher
would ever consider but problems that are "analytical."
This illusion, particularly strong in British and American
philosophical circles, received most recently a rebuff so sharp as to
make front page news. 68 The American Philosophical Association,
dictatorially ruled by the "analytical" establishment that has only
its sceptical solvent for questions relating to ontology, is now
challenged by a breakaway group, called the Society of
Philosophers in America. Members of the latter are resolved to
give proper attention to questions such as: What is being? Is there
a purpose? Is there something beyond the physical? and the like.
Their revolt is the bursting to the surface of Jong suppressed
dissatisfaction with the "received view," a quintessence of which
is Quine's answer to the most fundamental question, made famous
by Hamlet: "To be is to be the value of a boundary variable."
Clearly, such is not an answer that would have agitated a Hamlet or
anyone not shielded from reality by the emoluments of opulently
endowed chairs of philosophy. It is therefore supremely ironical
that Quine could be referred to as the "titan of American
philosophy," unless, of course, for the unintended reason that his
definition of "to be," if taken logically, that is, with full
consistency, is a foolproof directive to a titanic catastrophe of
thought and life.
It would be an illusion to hope for a change of heart on the part
of most "analysts" who, for ample reason, see no threat in that
revolt to their domination of the academia. They will continue to
dismiss their opponents' appeal to the long history of philosophy
with the words of Ruth B. Marcus of Yale, words illustrative of
the mere game with words into which the "analysts" can turn the
interpretation of philosophy or of anything else: "It's not just fake
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history, it isn't even history. The tradition up to Kant was
analytical. It was one of addressing questions in a careful way and
giving reasons for one's point of view." Clearly, the program of
instruction in most departments of philosophy will continue in its
"analytical" tracks.
Neither the true Plato, let alone the true
Aristotle in quest of making clear the understanding of the real,
will be spoken of, nor those who saved Aristotle from himself, and
much less those who presented that story to our times with
extraordinary historical scholarship. 69
An aspect of the poverty of that instruction in philosophy is that
it imparts no intellectual sensitivity for pondering the points which
precisely those critics of Al brought up who steeped their criticism
of it in the primacy of understanding.
A case in point is
Hofstadter's description of my Brain , Mind and Computers as a
book "whose every page exudes contempt for the computational
paradig m for understanding the mind." Yet, although he admits
that the book brings up points "interesting to ponder," he considers
none of them .10 Nor does he mention even the four main points of
my book, although, being the themes, prominently listed, of its
fo ur chapters,11 they are too obvious to be overlooked. None of
those points can, of course, be eye-catching to any of those
countless "modern" philosophers who try to begin understanding
with the forms of understanding that constitute "intelligent
behavior" and not with that understanding whose nature is to
understand things before it can understand itself.
One aspect of those points made in my book relates to some
patent, jewel-like evidences, the very source of philosophical
ri ches, of what it is to understand.
One's mental eyes are
continually excited by those evidences, one of them the word now
o r rather the intelligible reality it evokes. The reality is indeed the
immovable axis on which everything else revolves in intelligent
life, including any discourse about behavior, intelligent or not. It
has of ten been stated that animals experience neither the past nor
the future. If this is so, it is only because they have no sense of
the present. The now which does not exist for them, exists for
humans and is the very factor that turns their particular mental
possessions into that whole which is more than the sum of its parts .
It is in terms of that whole that humans can conceive of the
Perfect Being, God, in whom all is present all the time and this is
why He is not touched by time, the great spoiling factor.
Compared with that eternal present, man's grasp of the now is
incredibly imperfect though still so reliable as to constitute in his
mental " mac hinery" (a place with incessant transformations) the
pivotal factor that remains unchanged.
This is why man's
conscious identity, his chief and most precious possession, is

Language, Logic, Logos

119

retained through incessant transformations, not only mental but also
physical, including the entire replacement of all atoms in his body
(and brain) in every seven years. Chesterton's definition of a
machine reveals its philosophical depth precisely because it can
illustrate even the "machinery" of the mind without turning it into
a machine. In addition to depth he also showed courage when long
before the appearance of computers he labeled the expression
"thinking machine" as a "baseless phrase of modern fatalism and
materialism." A machine, he added, "only is a machine because it
cannot think."72 As to those who can take basic philosophical
advice only when it is offered by a prominent physicist, they
would do well to ponder Einstein's remark, targeted at no less a
logical positivist than Carnap, that the now completely escapes the
net of physics.73
What, indeed, would be a formalization, even remotely
convincing, of the now? For if an electrical impulse, or a given
dot on the screen, is taken to represent the now, do not thereby all
such impulses and dots become representative of the now and make
meaningless its arbitrarily chosen "formalist" representation?
Similar questions could be raised about such words as nevertheless,
if, but, however, and, last but not least, about as, a tiny word that
carries on its back an enormous variety of conceptual relations.
And what about signs of punctuation? They should seem so
easy to formalize as they are but mere forms, yet the intangible
nuances of meaning they are meant to convey are all too often
hopelessly elusive to a formalist representation. An exclamation
mark gives itself away and so does a quotation mark. Yet in both
cases a sense of impotency should be felt if some proportion were
to be found between the formalization and the shift in meaning
those marks can bring about. Thus the distance should seem
enormous between the unimportance suggested by a cursory "don't
mention it" and the crucial importance of a "don't mention it!"
The difference between God and "God" is abysmal and so is the
one between God and god, whereas most computers operate on the
basis that there is no difference between upper case and lower case.
A mere comma can turn the confidence of "God save the Queen"
into a cry of desperation: "God, save the Queen."74 Efforts at
formalization should seem doomed to failure if it is true, as H. W.
Fowler, the arbiter of the King's English, stated that a comma
"separates the inseparables." 75
Phrases of this kind, undoubtedly paradoxical, are instances of
the mind's inventiveness that should seem magical, if not plainly

absurd, from the reductionist viewpoint.

Prospects for finding

some formalization of that inventiveness are nowhere in sight.
Furthermore, ever fresh evidences of the inexhaustible riches of
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that inventiveness turn up continually. One of the pleasures of
keeping up with the latest and best in novels and poetry is to come
across ever new verbal virtuosities, whereby insights, situations,
motives, fears and hopes come alive in a light never seen before.
The average reader can savor at regular intervals either in The New
York Times Magaz ine76 or in the R eader's Digest77 fresh offerings
about the latest exploits in the use of language that should make
computer programmers groan with despair. The delight or plight
of teaching English has in part to do with being exposed to some
hilarious misuse of words and errors in spelling that turn up in
term papers.
College-bound students can come up with the
declaration that they want to be "bilingual in three or more
languages" or with their desire to be "weight-listed," or with a
gently needling " needles to say."78
As to the last two cases a computer can easily be programmed to
be led to the proper expression as the differences are but slight
between the incorrect and correct forms. The day may not be far
when computerized author listings will bring up the right author
even if his or her name has been slightly misspelled. The problem
represented by the improper use of bilingual is far more complex.
To cope with it the programmer has to pay attention to the large
variety in which bilingual can be connected with names of
languages and various groups of them.
Programming subtle
paradoxical nuances may present so great a difficulty as to appear
insurmountable.
TEN GUIDELINES ABOUT Al
In view of all this, nothing is more tempting than to oppose Al
on the ground that practically impossible may seem the task of
programming into computers the kind of information that goes
considerably beyond the use of purely quantitative terms. 79 Such a
temptation must be resisted for a reason far more serious than the
prospect of making a wrong bet. In fact, if guidelines are to be set
for dealing with the cultural malaise embodied in AI, the first
should be the following: Don't insist unnecessarily on the enormous
complexity of formalization connected with ordinary human
discourse and reasoning .
Undoubtedly, insistence on that difficulty can effectively cut to
size brash spokesmen of AI and deny them undeserved
psychological advantage. But the same insistence may undermine
the merits of a truly dualist view of man as outlined above.
According to that view, all workings of the human mind , insofar as
they are conveyed, that is, made known, have sensory aspects
which lend themselves to various degrees of formalization.
A
co mplete listing, for the purposes of programming, of all those
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aspects may forever lie beyond the combined practical capabilities
of all human talents, but great advances along these lines have been
made and even more of them will come, and at an accelerated rate.
A genuine dualist should never become a crypto-manichean
suspicious of technology and even of that technology-on-paper,
which is programming. Insistence on the failures of programming
should never serve as the basis of defense of the existence of the
human mind . Such a basis would prove as counterproductive as
did those arguments in which shortcomings of physical science
were taken for a justification to invoke God. Holes in scientific
knowledge have an uncanny way of being filled up and leave
shortsighted divines stranded. Formalization, too, will proceed by
leaps and bounds.
The second guideline is that while with respect to formalization
one should be most generously minded, one should not yield an
inch, not even the fraction of an inch, on the essential issue of
understanding. That issue is the priority of understanding over the
formalization of what is understood. Those who oppose AI on any
other ground inevitably give away the game. They do not fail to
demonstrate the dire consequence of dangling one's hand through
the bars of a lion's cage. Two cases have already been mentioned .
One is the denying to computers wisdom and creativity while
grant ing them ordinary understanding or intelligence. The other is
to grant to computers the ability to know but not the ability to
experience purpose. A third one is the granting to computers the
ability to make some modest discoveries but not the ones that
represent a real breakthrough.so The computer no more discovers
anything than does a slide rule or an abacus.
The third guideline relates not to the difficulties of
formalization but to the claims according to which AI has been
achieved in whatever rudimentary form . While the countering of
those claims is ultimately a philosophical task, psychologically a
most effective use can be made of blunt appraisals of the state of
art by some leaders in computer programming. One of those
appraisals was heard in the full glare of publicity at the 1984
conference of the computer-science community in San Francisco.
There Herbert Grosch, a member of the advisory board of the
Association for Computer Management, minced no words: "The
emperor, whether we call him fifth-generation project or artificial
intelligence, is stark from the ankles up. Or to put it in the
vernacular, most of what we're talking about is a bunch of crap.
Now I said from the ankles up. From the ankles down the emperor

is wearing a well-worn and sturdy pair of shoes ...and we call them
expert systems ... they are good. We need lots and lots of expert
systems. And we'll grind them out the way we've been grinding
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them out for thirty years. We won't generate them with magic.
We won't generate them with artificial intelligence."81
The
effectiveness of recalling outspoken criticisms of AI that may
appear too negative, can greatly be strengthened with references to
some scathing words which basically sympathetic critics of AI
offered about some programs embodying conve rsati o nal
understanding: "I have just said," M. Boden wrote, "that PARRY
is a fraud. This is fair comment also on ELIZA, to whom human
interlocutors typically attribute a good deal of common sense and
reasoning ability."&2
The fourth guideline is about the paramount importance of
seeing through the hollowness of the rhetoric of advocates of Al.
Whenever they admit the substantial failure of this or that project,
they credit the failure with great advances as well. A case in point
is the statement Michael Brady of MIT made in 1985 about the
status of robotics: "Robotics is the intelligent connection of
perception to action .... We've barely scratched the surface. It is
going to be a long haul for hundreds of years to get to anything
with the same kind of capabilities as man. On the other hand ,
there has been some damn spectacular work in the last five or ten
years."83 A curious scratching of the surface that, admittedly, was
but barely touched . The interview, of which Brady's words formed
a part, was presented under the title, "Today's robots have to be
told." Obviously Brady could not convince the reporter that the
wall separating non-intelligence from intelligence has bee n pie rced
by robotics, however slightly.
Especially much should be made, and this is the fifth guideline ,
of the occasional admission by AI advocates about a pressing need
for clarifying basic philosophical questions. " We do have problems," stated Edward Feigenbaum, "and they could be illuminated
by a first-class philosopher." Typically, Feigenbaum failed to spell
out those problems as he saw them . He could think "of only one,
perhaps two philosophers who have the grasp of what AI and
computing are all about, and also know philosophy." They were of
no use, according to him, because both were busy with their own
problems and not with the basic philosophical problems posed by
Al. Clearly, such was a transparently cheap way of coping with a
situation, which, and here Feigenbaum was on target, could not be
cleared up with Dreyfus's phenomenology, aptly described by
Fe igenbaum as "that ball of fluff! That cotton candy!"84
The sixth guideline is that only by being steeped in moderate or
methodical realism can one cope with false philosophical criticisms
of claims about Al. The most talked about of those criticisms is
the one offered by Dreyfus who falsifies Aristotle by turning him
into a forerunner of Descartes!85 By taking Aristotle for an
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intu1t10nist, he ignores Aristotle the realist and the very reason for
which Aristotle was a critic of Plato insofar as the latter was a
rationalist. But if one can ignore that difference between Plato and
Aristotle, the far greater difference between Aristotle and
Descartes will appear non-existent. Furthermore, nothing will then
transpire about the straight road that led from Descartes's
rationalism (a subtle form of the priority of the formal and
mathematical over the physical or ontologically real) to De la
Mettrie's sheer materialism.86
The farce is then crowned by
Dreyfus's effort to overcome the dehumanizing materialist
consequences of Al ideology by opting for a covert materialism.
To be sure, human thinking is a reality only because the mind
operates in and through a body. Dreyfus rightly emphasizes the
bodily parameters of the expression of any perception and
judgment.
They are indeed omnipresent, enormously large in
number, and interconnected in staggeringly complex ways. But this
does not turn the act of understanding into a mere bodily or
physical process, however complex. Yet Dreyfus would be the last
to take the mind for a reality essentially different from the body,
however closely connected with it.87 No wonder. Phenomenology,
which he takes for a guide, has been notorious for blocking
genuinely metaphysical perspectives and has served all too often as
a specious excuse to disregard them.
The seventh guideline is methodical realism which is a dogged,
systematic resolve to recall at every juncture the basics in
epistemology. This procedure is the only safe guide when it comes
to criticisms of AI that are dressed more in scientific than in
philosophical terms. The chief among them is the one offered by
Godel, author of the famous incompleteness theorems in
mathematics that formed the center of many debates about Al.
This is not the place to sum up, however briefly, those debates.88
Let it merely be noted that, according to those theorems, no set of
mathematical propositions can have its proof of consistency within
itself. Herein lies a feature , which a machine obviously cannot
em body, namely, to "go outside itself'' for a proof of its
consistency which it must have or else it would not work in a
genuinely machine-like manner.
Only those overawed by mathematics or formalization see a
crucial argument against AI in those theorems. They do so by
taking them for a proof that there is at least one thing a man can
do that a machine cannot. Severed from sound epistemology that
argument does not amount to much. Godel, in fact, provided a
telling illustration of this as he granted to computers the ability to
know, though with the meager proviso that the ability in question
will not include mathematical certainty. 89
Clearly, Godel
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overlooked the elementary fact that it is the immediate certainty
(never achieved with the aid of mathematics) of knowing ordinary
external reality that alone assures the applicability of mathematics
to physical reality, including the ability to talk about it to other
real beings.
Certainty of knowledge severed from that reality will easily
become a feature of the solipsist heaven. In fact, it is that
solipsism which threatens to engulf Popper's scorn for computers as
so many "glorified pencils"90 and his criticism of them as thinking
machines. The criticism is aimed at Turing's challenge or the claim
that any specified, that is, formalized way of man's superiority
over computers can be shown to be computerizable. Against that
challenge Popper offered the distinction between specifiability or
formalizability and subjective experience. This distinction, as it
stands in Popper's phrasing, cannot cope with the fact that the
subjective, as such, can never be communicated. For once it is
communicated, it takes on tangible, that is, specifiable or
formalizable aspects. Popper would not, however, admit, and for
strictly antimetaphysical reasons, that the act of verbalizing an
intellectual judgment represents a unity of mind and matter, of the
unformalizable and of the formalizable . By taking refuge in the
"subjective," which he does not identify with an objectively
existing mind or soul, Popper can only warn that "Turing's
challenge should not be taken up,"91 a warning that counsels resolve
not to meet one's opponent head-on.
In debating with advocates of AI, and this is the eighth
guideline, one should remain especially aware of the difference
be twee n proofs and convincing.
Proofs, however sound in
themselves, can be convincing, that is, effective with a real
opponent only if reality as such is acknowledged as the ground of
any proof. Anyone who is unwilling to admit the primacy of
man's grasp of reality either when he thinks or when he acts for a
purpose, makes himself immune to arguments about the inanity of
Al.
That by the same unwillingness one locks himself into
solipsism has, of course, its own instructiveness, though onl y for
the realist.
The solipsist is a philosophical narcissist who,
enamored of his own mental physiognomy, grows unappreciative of
the real world around him. In view of what has been said about
AI as an invitation to solipsism, advocates of AT fully dese rve
Chesterton's devastating "Cherish it!"--his reply to one who
extolled solipsism as the best of all philosophies .92
The ninth guideline calls for courage to call a spade a spade .
The daring may seem outrageous, but hardly unnecessary in a
society that merrily marches down the road to anarchy. The march
is to the tune of brass bands composed of academics who have
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been busy trumpeting that exclusive attention to quantitatively
specifiable patterns is the only posture with intellectual
respectability.93 Such a pattern is on hand whenever a behavior, no
matter how queer, is acted upon in a statistically significant
number. From there it is but a short step to claims to legal
recognition and protection, as on the basis of mere patterns, so
many pure formalizations, everything becomes a mere machinery,
with no allowance for distinctions between the morally good and
the morally evil.
Hence the steady erosion of sensitivity for
hallowed principles, as if they were so many words, and the
growing readiness to grant social respectability to any behavior,
provided it establishes itself as a pattern.
The measure to which Al ideology is fueling that s101strous
decay of modern society should seem obvious. To oppose that
subversive trend the least one should do is to imitate the courage of
Winston Churchill, not a great philosopher by any standard but
certainly alert to threats which so many of his contemporaries
preferred to ignore.
On being presented, in 1949, with an
honorary degree at MIT, an early stronghold of AI research,
Churchill had to listen to the oration of the dean of humanities
who boldly predicted, with an eye on computers and biochemistry,
the complete control of human mind and will within the
foreseeable future. In accepting the honor conferred upon him,
Churchill acidly remarked that he "would be content to be dead
before that happens."94
Courageous remarks are not, however, enough, which is the very
point of the tenth and last guideline. One may wonder whether
Churchill was sufficiently aware of the debt which his sense of
human dignity owed to Christian cultural tradition. Yet, even
more frequently than in Churchill's days is the brave claim made in
purely secularist circles that the unconditional dignity of the
individual can be secured on grounds that exclude religious
perspectives. Historically, the matter should be clear. Sophocles
could compose admirable choruses about the marvel which is man
and especially about the marvel of human speech, but he remained
perplexed in the face of Antigone's single-minded commitment to
moral ideals. His perplexity was part of a surrender to a blind
Fate engulfing all human beings and above all their dignity.9S
Escape from that dead end came only when the human word
was found to be a worthy means for carrying mere man into God's
innermost life. Belief in the Word (Logos), eternally uttered by the
Father, has become the salvation of human words as well. Only in

that perspective have those words remained immune to being
degraded into mere tools of facile intellectual games, all aimed at
undermining the intellect itself. Such games systematically cater to
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infatuation with the moment, so different from the now
transcending the succession of moments.
Hence the
irreconcilability of a view of the mind, trapped in those games,
with the vision of Christ as one who is the same yesterday, today
and forever (Heb 13:8). The eternal now which is Christ is the
inspiration behind the motto, stat crux dum volvitur orbis, engraved
on the obelisk at the center of St Peter's Square in Rome, a motto
evocative of Chesterton's view of the machine, be that machine of
cosmic dimensions.
Those unwilling to follow this theological train of thought may
not be equally reluctant to take a closer than customary look at
scientific history. Advocates of Al are wont to look at the alleged
advent of AI as the culmination of man's scientific progress. They
still have to face up to an apparently most untheological question
about science: Why did science, the great pride and advantage of
the Western world, not arise in any of the great ancient cultures?
The question should seem all the more important as the rise of
science in ancient China or India would have greatly changed the
course of world history. Few things are indeed as instructive as
the desperate efforts in the modern counterparts of those cultures
to catch up with Western science and the various explanations given
there for their backwardness.%
Any serious probing into these topics brings up, however,
questions about world views and with them theology, too. In all
those cultures the world view was dominated by emanationism
which invariably implies the growing absence of order and
rationality as the chain of being extends farther and farther from
the source of emanation, however divine. It was only with belief
in that Word or Logos--as is clear from the writings of Athanasius
who fully perceived in Arianism a potential backsliding into
emanationism--that there came a categorical assertion about the
full rationality of a world created by a fully divine Logos.97 Was
not that cosmic rationality--so alien to the Greeks of old who took
the sublunary realm for the arena of partial disorder--the very
precondition for seeing the fall of an apple and of the moon as
expression of the same law?
Was not empirical investigation
sparked precisely because a given set of created physical laws could
be seen as contingent, that is, only one among an infinitely large
number of possible sets of laws, all available for the free choice of
a truly transcendental, personal Creator? Was not belief in the
createdness of man's mind to the image of such a Creator the
source of confidence that man's words, the tangible signs of his
intellect, can truly grasp the laws of a universe no less created than
was man's mind?98 And was not that createdness best safeguarded
among all monotheistic religions in the one in which the work of
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creation was assigned to the Word?99
In That Hideous Strength, C. S. Lewis offers a remark couched
in medieval garb about those who lose their hold on human words
because of their growing insensitivity to God's word.100 Modern
secularized culture, which wallows in mental contortions
(poignantly evoked by Escher's drawingslOI) to make the idea of AI
respectable, certainly illustrates this point. But those ready to make
that point and appreciative of not yet being engulfed in a global
vortex of irrationality, must have an eye for the other side of the
coin as well. (That a coin has two sides to it may seem obvious,
but only the Word of God made an emphatic recall of that
elementary truth, another memorable proof of His being a
safeguard of rational balance). If indeed our cultural debt to that
Word or Logos is immense, we must be logical to the point of
realizing our intellectual duties as well.
Those duties are part of that Christian worship about which Paul
enjoined that it should be a logike latreia, or a reasoned worship
(Romans 12: 1). While Paul did not recommend logic chopping, he
certainly did not suggest a timid , let alone a suspicious recourse to
reason.1°2 History is a witness that a steadying hold on the Word of
God always implied a firm resolve to vindicate the human word as
a reliable tie with intelligible reality, physical and spiritual, human
and divine. Such a view of reality is the basis of that salvation
which safeguards man's ability to wonder in the broadest sense.
Wonderment is not only the condition of that love of wisdom, to
recall the very opening of Aristotle's Metaphysics, which is
philosophy, but also the mental stance that alone can do justice to
the wonder which is any machine, primitive or sophisticated.
It is that wonder which is turned into a pseudo-admiration
within the ideology supportive of AI and therein lies its sin against
humanity. For as Chesterton put it in his Heretics: "The wrong is
not that engines are too much admired, but that they are not
admired enough. The sin is not that engines are mechanical, but
that men are mechanicaJ."103 Whereas machines cannot sin, a chief
of man's sins has become his abuse of machines. Recent history is
in fact a record of tragic abuses of artifacts that in themselves are
but so many wonders of human inventiveness. In view of this
disheartening past, contemplation of the future should be full of
foreboding about possible abuses of that machine, which, though
perhaps the most wondrous among all of man's machines, should be
best called a mere logic machine.
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